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Abstract
This paper provides an interpretation of the uncertainty that exists on election morning as to who will win. It is based on the theory that there are a number of possible conditions of nature that can exist on election day, of which one is drawn. Political betting markets provide a way of trying to estimate this uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is different from polling standard errors, which estimate sample-size uncertainty. This paper also introduces a ranking assumption concerning dependencies across U.S. states.
The assumption does well when tested using data for the 2004 presidential election and the 2006 Senate election. It is shown that if the ranking assumption is correct, the two political parties should spend all their money on a few states, which seems consistent with their actual behavior in 2004.
On election morning, after all the campaigning has been completed, there is still uncertainty as to who will win. This paper provides an interpretation of what this uncertainty is. The theory is that there are a number of possible "conditions" of nature that can exist on election day, of which one is drawn. The uncertainty is which condition will be drawn. This theory is presented first, followed by a discussion of a way in which this uncertainty can be estimated using political betting markets. Polling standard errors are then discussed, where it is argued that they do not provide estimates of the type of uncertainty considered in this paper.
The rest of the paper is concerned with an assumption about dependencies across U.S. states, called the "ranking" assumption, that puts restrictions on the possible conditions of nature than can exist on election day.
The Theory
It is assumed that on election day there are n possible conditions of nature regarding the events that will take place during the day, each with probability 1/n of occurring.
If in p percent of the n conditions candidate A wins, then p is the probability that A wins. 1 The theory is that there are a number of possible conditions left at the end of a campaign and that the uncertainty is which condition will be drawn. Even if one knew the n possible conditions of nature, the best that one could say at the beginning of election day is that A would win with probability p.
An alternative way of thinking about the morning of the election is that there is 1 It could also be assumed that conditions have different probabilities of occurring, where the probability that a candidate wins is then the sum of the probabilities of the conditions in which the candidate wins.
only one condition of nature left. In this case if one knew the condition, the outcome would be known with certainty. There are a number of reasons, however, to think that there is more than one possible condition left. First, different conditions may correspond to different weather characteristics, and weather may affect turnout, which may benefit one candidate relative to the other. Second, different conditions may correspond to different events that happen to a voter on election day before the voter votes, and these events may affect the voter's decision. For example, people's feelings and moods may be affected by the day's events, which may affect their voting decisions. Put another way, some voters may not decide whom to vote for until they enter the booth, and this is modeled here by assuming that there are some conditions of nature-events that happen during the day before voting-in which a particular voter votes one way and other conditions in which he or she votes the other way.
Let S denote the set of possible conditions of nature that exist on election day.
During the course of a campaign, many things happen that can affect S. If, for example, candidate A does poorly in a debate, this may eliminate a number of possible conditions of nature that otherwise would have existed on election day in which A wins. S is thus different than it otherwise would have been had A not done poorly in the debate. One can think of a campaign as trying to eliminate as many possible conditions of nature as possible in which its candidate loses.
It may be the case that S contains almost no possible conditions of nature in which one candidate loses a particular state. For example, in the 2004 U.S.
presidential election, there were probably very few possible conditions of nature in which President Bush lost Texas. S could still be a large set, but a set in which almost all conditions contain a Bush win in Texas.
Estimating Uncertainty
Political betting markets provide one way of trying to estimate the uncertainty just discussed. The market considered in this paper is Intrade. (Manski 2006 ) has shown that under certain assumptions about the beliefs of traders the market saying that the market expects that in 53.9 percent of the possible conditions of nature on election day Bush wins Florida.
The fifth column in Table 1 presents the prices of the state contracts that existed at 6:00 AM Eastern time on the day of the election, November 2, 2004. This is the time at which the first poll opened. (Ignore for now columns one through four in Table 1 .) The states are ranked in Table 1 
Polling Standard Errors
It is interesting to contrast the type of uncertainty considered in this paper-perhaps measured well by political betting markets-with the type of uncertainty measured by standard errors from polls. Polling standard errors measure sample-size uncerprice of a contract is not necessarily the mean belief of the traders. However, under what appear to be plausible assumptions, this bias is either zero or small-see (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2007) . This paper is based on the assumption that the bias is zero.
tainty. The larger the sample, the smaller the standard error. To see why this uncertainty is different from that considered in this paper, consider the extreme case in which every eligible voter were asked the day before the election whether he or she was planning to vote and for whom. This would yield a mean vote share with a standard error of zero. 4 In this case there would be no uncertainty from the poll, but the type of uncertainty considered in this paper would still exist. In other words, if political betting markets measure well the type of uncertainty considered in this paper, the betting-market prices would not necessarily be 0.0 or 100.0 when the polling standard errors were zero.
To examine uncertainty estimates from polling standard errors versus those from political betting markets, one can compare the probability of winning a state that is backed out from state polling data with the probability as estimated by the Intrade price. each with a sample size of 600, the total sample size is 3,000. The backed out probabilities in Table 2 are based the assumption of a normal distribution. An interesting example using backed-out probabilities from polling data is in (Leigh and Wolfers 2006 Regarding the use of Intrade prices to estimate the type of uncertainty considered in this paper, one cannot rule out the possibility that these prices are in part affected by polling standard errors. So part of the uncertainty reflected in the Intrade prices might be sample-size uncertainty. If this is true, this bias will fall as the sample sizes increase, but if there is uncertainty of the type considered in this paper, the Intrade prices will not approach 0 or 1 as the sample sizes increase.
Finally, the analysis in this section should not be interpreted as an attack on polls. All it says is that there is a type of uncertainty that is not estimated by polling standard errors.
The Ranking Assumption
The rest of this paper is concerned with an assumption about dependencies across U.S. states. It uses the "conditions of nature" framework discussed above. The assumption, called the "ranking" assumption, puts restrictions on the possible conditions of nature than can exist on election day.
The assumption is easy to describe. Rank the states by p i on the morning of the election, as is done in Table 1 It should be stressed that the ranking assumption is at best only an approximation to reality. It is a rule of thumb for thinking about how events across states might be correlated. It will be seen below that it does well for the 2004 and 2006 elections, but this is a small sample. It will take more elections before one can judge with any confidence how good an approximation it is, but at least the results so far are promising.
It is common in previous work to assume some form of independence. (Kaplan and Barnett 2003) assume that the state outcomes are independent, that "the events that the candidate is leading in various states are mutually independent" (p. 33). (Snyder 1989 ) analyzes districts and assumes that the elections in the districts are all statistically independent. He points out that this rules out "uncertainty about national variables that may affect the electoral outcomes in all districts simultaneously, such as changes in aggregate output or foreign policy crises" (p. 646). (Brams and Davis 1974) assume that "the voting of uncommitted voters within each state is statistically independent" (p. 120). (Strömberg 2002) assumes that the state level popularity parameters of a candidate are independent, although he also has a national popularity parameter. (Soumbatiants, Chappell, and Johnson 2006) have both national and state-specific shocks.
What would it mean in the present context for the state probabilities to be 7 Ed Kaplan has pointed out to me that given a ranking like in Table 1 , under the ranking assumption there are only 52 possible outcomes: Bush takes all 51, Bush takes all but the last one, Bush takes all but the last two, etc. This compares to 2 51 possible outcomes, about 2.25 million billion.
A remarkable economy of outcomes has been achieved by the ranking assumption! independent? On election day the probability of Bush winning state i is simply the percent of his state i wins in the n possible conditions of nature. The probabilities will, of course, change if the n possible conditions of nature change. Consider as a thought experiment different sets of n possible conditions of nature on election day. Say that Bush has done poorly in the debates in set 1 and well in set 2. One would expect all the state probabilities to be higher for Bush in set 2. In set 2
there would fewer conditions of nature in which Bush loses any given state. The state probabilities in this case would be positively correlated. In order for the probabilities to be uncorrelated, the sets must differ in state-specific ways. For example, the Republican party might be better organized in California in set 1 than in set 2, but everything else the same. The two sets would then differ only regarding the probability for California. These state-specific differences across different sets of the n possible conditions of nature seem less likely to occur than differences that affect all the state probabilities.
The ranking assumption does not, of course, directly concern different sets of the n possible conditions of nature. It simply puts restrictions on the n possible conditions of nature that exist on election day. If state i is ranked ahead of state j, then in no condition of nature does Bush win j and lose i. The concept of different sets of the n possible conditions of nature is not needed.
Tests of the Ranking Assumption using Intrade Data
Given the outcome of the 2004 election, the joint hypothesis that 1) the Intrade price ranking on the last day is correct and 2) the ranking assumption is correct can be tested. 
A Further Look at Intrade's Accuracy
Note from Table 1 that Intrade's ranking of the states varied somewhat between September 7 and election day. It is important to realize that these changes in the ranking are not inconsistent with the ranking assumption because the assumption pertains only to the ranking on the last day. 
Do Intrade Traders Use the Ranking Assumption?
Unlike the above comparisons to the actual outcomes, the following is not a test of the ranking assumption. It is instead an examination of whether the Intrade traders are using the ranking assumption to price various contracts.
For this examination four other days of Intrade prices were sampled. These are presented in the first four columns in pect if traders were using the ranking assumption. This can be seen in Table 4 , which presents prices for various combination contracts along with what the ranking assumption would predict the prices should be and what the independence assumption would predict. For the Bush Greatplains contract, for example, the price predicted by the ranking assumption is the price of the lowest ranked state in the contract, which for September 7 is Minnesota with a price of 40.0. The price predicted by the independence assumption is simply the product of the state prices (after dividing each price by 100 and multiplying the final product by 100).
It is clear from Table 4 that the predictions are much closer under the ranking assumption than under the independence assumption. The worst case for the independence assumption is Bush South, where for September 7 the ranking-assumption price is 60.5, the price for Florida, and the independence-assumption price is 18.9. These compare to the actual price of the contract of 55.0. The only weak case for the ranking assumption is Bush OH+FL for November 2, where the contract price is 37.0 and the price predicted by the ranking assumption is 51.1.
Although the results in Table 4 have to be taken with some caution because the markets are thinly traded, they are supportive of the view that the Intrade traders are using the ranking assumption to price the combination contracts. Table 3 plus Tennessee (which according to Intrade was not close). If traders were using the ranking assumption, the price of this contract should have been 46.5, one minus the price for Virginia (using the last price). Under the assumption that the probabilities of the first six states are independent (and everything else certain), the price of the contract should have been 88.6, one minus the product of the six probabilities (using the last prices). The actual price at 6:00 AM was 66.4 using the last price and 67.2 using the average of the bid and ask prices (bid was 66.4, ask was 67.9). So the market price was almost exactly halfway between the ranking assumption price and the independence assumption price. The actual price is in fact consistent with the use of independence assumption for Missouri and Virginia and certainty otherwise. In this case the price should have been 69.6, one minus the product of the two probabilities (using the last prices), which is close to the actual. So in this case the traders were not using the ranking assumption to price the Republican-control contract. They, of course, should have, given that the actual results were exactly as the joint hypothesis of a correct Intrade ranking and the ranking assumption predicted. Those who ignored the ranking assumption and bought the contract (assuming, say, independence for Missouri and Virginia) lost.
Political Party Responses to Uncertainty
This section shows that if the ranking assumption holds, the two political parties in a presidential election should spend money in only a few states. It is first
necessary to consider what it means within the context of this paper for the prices in Table 1 to change across time and in some cases to change the ranking of the states. It is important to realize that these changes, even changes in ranking, are not inconsistent with the ranking assumption because the assumption pertains only to the ranking on the last day.
Let p i denote the probability that Bush wins state i on election day, which is the percent of the n conditions of nature in which Bush wins state i. Assume that these probabilities are estimated precisely by the Intrade prices on the day before the election-the prices in the last price column in Table 1 .
Consider the prices on September 7, about two months before the election. Let p it denote the price for state i on date t, where in this case t is September 7. Let u it denote the estimation error for state i and date t:
For t equal to September 7, u it for a given state is the difference between the first price column in Table 1 and the last price column. Surprises that happen between, say, September 7 and election day will change the estimated probabilities (and thus prices) as people update their views about the conditions of nature that will exist on election day. A surprise negative performance by Bush in the debates would likely lower nearly all the estimated probabilities. If all the estimated probabilities fell by the same amount, there would be no change in the ranking. The fact that the ranking in Table 1 changes somewhat over time means that some surprises are state specific. There are thus state specific components in u it in (1).
Stochastic Simulation
Before considering the spending strategy of the two parties, it will be useful to examine the effects of state-specific variation in the estimation errors. This is done in Table 6 using stochastic simulation. To focus on state-specific variation, the errors are taken for the simulation work to be uncorrelated across states. The states used are the 13 states with prices between 30.0 and 70.0 on September 7.
For the results in Table 6 t is September 7. For each state i, u it is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ 2 . σ 2 is assumed to be the same across states.
The stochastic-simulation experiments were performed as follows. For each trial 13 errors were drawn from the N(0, σ 2 ) distribution, one per state, where σ varied from zero for the first experiment to 0.05 for the sixth experiment. Consider a given experiment, i.e., a given value of σ. Let u (k) it denote the error drawn for state i on the kth trial. The probability for state i on the kth trial was computed as:
In this contextp it is the "base" probability. The results in Table 6 are easy to explain. When the variance is zero, Nevada is always pivotal and the probability of winning the election is always .600. 10 As 8 For this work 270, not 269, was taken to be the number of electoral votes needed to win.
9 It can be the case in the stochastic simulations that p
it for a particular state i is greater than the base probability for states above the highest ranked state used (West Virginia) or less than the base probability for states below the lowest ranked state used (Michigan). This does not matter for the results, however, because the solutions that matter are around the pivotal state. The stochastic simulation could have been set up using all the states, but, as just noted, this is not necessary. If all states were used, the assumption that the variance of the error is the same across states would have to be changed. The variance is obviously smaller when the base probability is near one or zero than when it is near one half. 10 In Table 4 Florida is listed as the pivotal state for September 7, whereas in When σ is zero, i.e., no state-specific variation, all that matters in terms of predicting the probability of winning the election is the probability for the pivotal state. It does not matter, for example, how much larger the probabilities for the states above the pivotal state are or how much smaller the probabilities for the states below the pivotal state are. As just seen, this changes when σ is non zero-the sizes of the probabilities around the pivotal state now matter.
The stochastic simulations were repeated using the September 21 data (t = September 21), and the results are presented in Table 7 . These results are similar to those in Table 7 , although with higher probabilities, except that some states are now never pivotal nor above the pivotal. The fact that the base probabilities for Iowa and New Hampshire have risen substantially leads to these states doing all the extra work. Even with its 21 electoral votes, Pennsylvania is never used.
Campaign Spending
The insights from Tables 6 and 7 can now be used to examine campaign spending across states. Each possible condition of nature on election day is based on everything that has happened up to the day of the election. "Everything" includes all the campaigning that has been done in each state. After all the campaigning is over, the ranking assumption says that there is no possible condition of nature in which Bush wins a state ranked below a state he loses. This is not to say, of course, that campaigning has no effect on the possible conditions of nature. It is just that once campaigning is over, the ranking assumption holds.
Consider now the strategy of the Republican party on some date t before the election. Assume for now that the Republican party does not take into account any 
where r it is the actual amount the Republican party spends in state i between date t and election day and d it is the similar variable for the Democratic party. Equation (3) says that spending in a state affects the probability of winning the state. The
Republican party faces a budget constraint that the sum of r it across all the states cannot exceed some amount, and similarly for the Democratic party.
Assume that decisions are being made on date t equal to September 7, so t is fixed, and assume for now that d it does not respond to changes in r it . If the Republican party wants to maximize the probability of winning the election, what
should it do? Consider first the case in which the variance of u it in equation (3) is zero for all i. In this case under the ranking assumption the Republican party simply maximizes the probability of winning the pivotal state. In Table 1 then the values ranked to determine the pivotal-state value. For the given value of r t this can be done, say, for 10,000 draws of u t . This gives 10,000 values of the probability of winning the election, from which summary measures like those in Table 6 can be computed.
One can think of the Republican party considering many values of r t and for each value computing 10,000 probabilities and summary measures like those in Table 6 . Its objective might be to choose r t to maximize the median of the probability values, the minimum of the values, or the value below which 5 percent of the trial values lie. This last option means that there would be a 95 percent chance that the actual probability of winning on election day is above the maximized value.
Whatever is maximized, Table 6 shows that when the variance of the errors is not zero the optimal strategy for the party would be to allocate some of its spending to states below Nevada, the pivotal state when the variance of the errors is zero.
Some states that are below Nevada now have, depending on the draw for u t , some chance of being pivotal, and so it would be optimal to spend something on these states.
The addition of uncertainty has thus increased the number of states in which spending is done. Table 6 shows that as the variance of the errors increases, the number of states that are sometimes pivotal increases. Thus, the larger the variance, the larger the number of states in which spending is done. It is still the case, of course, that in most states no spending is done.
Consider finally the Democratic-party response to a Republican-party move,
i.e., relax the assumption that d it is fixed. . In any given presidential election the two parties generally have similar resources and similar information. It also seems likely that the effects of spending on votes are similar between the two parties.
If there is complete symmetry between the two parties and, say, the Republicans move first, then the Democrats can merely offset whatever the Republicans do. In practice this seems to be roughly the case. Both parties focus their spending on the swing states and come close to matching each other by state in terms of number of visits by the candidates and advertising spending. If one party begins to do more in a key state, the other party tends to respond. Also, there is essentially no spending in many states, which, as discussed next, is consistent with the ranking assumption but not the independence assumption.
No attempt is made in this paper to set up a formal game between the two parties under the ranking assumption. This is a possibly interesting area for future work. With a probability structure like that in Table 1 , where many states are close to zero or 100, it seems clear from the results in Table 6 that if a game is set up using the ranking assumption, there are likely to be many states in which there is no spending by either party. This is contrary to results in the literature that are based on the independence assumption. In the model of (Snyder 1989) , for example, spending is high in states that are close and that have a high probability of being pivotal, but there is some spending in all states. The same is true for the model in (Strömberg 2002 ). In the model of (Brams and Davis 1974) there is spending in all states, where spending is in proportion to the 3/2's power of the number of electoral votes in each state.
Conclusion
This paper provides an interpretation of the uncertainty that exists on election morning as to who will win. It is based on the theory that there are a number of possible conditions of nature that can exist on election day, of which one is drawn. Political betting markets like Intrade provide a way of trying to estimate this uncertainty. Polling standard errors, on the other hand, do not provide estimates of this type of uncertainty. They estimate sample-size uncertainty, which can be driven close to zero with a large enough sample.
This paper also introduces a ranking assumption, which puts restrictions on the possible conditions of nature than can exist on election day. The joint hypothesis that the last-day Intrade ranking is correct and the ranking assumption is correct be using the ranking assumption in pricing the national contract with one exception.
It is interesting that this exception may be due to market maniuplation. There is some evidence that the national contract was being manipulated in the period that incompasses September 23. This is another example of possible problems due to thin trading. But in general the ranking assumption explains the national contract price well. • RCP is the Real Clear Politics average of a number of polls. • Southwest: NV, NM, UT, & CO.
• New England: CT, RI, ME, VT, MA, & NH.
• Rustbelt: PA, OH, & MI.
• Westcoast: CA, OR, & WA. • 10000 trials per value of σ.
• p (k) v = probability of winning the election for the kth trial, which is the probability of winning the pivotal state.
• .05 for p (k) v means the value below which 5 percent of the trial values lie. • See notes to Table 4 .
• The prices (base probabilities) from Table 1 • PA, NM, MN, OR, and MI were never used. 
